So where is the need for this so-called BDCA, while China has historically violated all previous agreements by invading Tibet, Aksai Chin, Zhou-en-Lai`s statement during his visit to India in 1962, that China will not attack India, violation of the 2005 agreement on maintaining peace and calm through intrusions into Despang and Chumar, and the ardour of denial that suggests many others will follow. China`s future action should be clear; Keep India busy with new agreements to prevent them from breaking up and denying over and over again that they have ever violated any of them – the symptoms of an ordinary thug. Before Singh`s visit to China, I wrote a rather critical piece for The Diplomat, in which I argued that the way India resolved the crisis was strategically reckless. Other commentators argued that India`s strategy towards China was more nuanced than it could appear at first glance. In reality, the BDCA could do little to reduce the likelihood of a border dispute between India and China along the LoAC, but in the end, the agreement appears to be in India`s interest. It ensures that in the event of monstrous aggression, such as Daulat Beg Oldi, there are a number of bilaterally agreed rules to report the situation. On 23 October 2013, Beijing successfully signed a Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) with India to undermine the debate over its recent strategic offensive behaviour. While the agreement appears to have set a positive tone for future talks between New Delhi and Beijing, it does not lead to any significant change in Chinese policy. The most recent mechanism is a simple symbolic agreement that has failed to achieve tangible progress on the ground. The two countries are divided over the delimitation of several border areas of the Himalayas and fought a brief war in 1962. From time to time, tensions flare up. This was demonstrated in April 2013, when a military contingent of the People`s Liberation Army of China (PLA) penetrated deep into the Depsang Plateau, east of Von Ladakhs, a region of Jammu and Kashmir that shares a border with China. The troops pitched tents on Indian territory, violated previous confidence-building measures and pushed India into a diplomatic and military scam.
Reading the text of article VI makes it clear that the BDCA is doing little to reduce the likelihood of misperception of LoAC. Article VI expressly prohibits one party from actively prosecuting or prosecuting another party`s patrols, as was the case in April. The need for a critical review of the proposal and the willingness to say a categorical “no” to anything that undermines India`s sovereignty, security and defence are not exaggerated. India`s defence minister was right to assert India`s right to develop infrastructure and improve defence readiness on its soil, as the Chinese had done. The banality of the text of the recent defence cooperation agreement is proof that India is losing to China in terms of strategic leverage. The ability of these mechanisms to make some kind of breakthrough in the interminable territorial and border conflict between China and India seems increasingly questionable in light of recent confidence-building measures aimed solely at “advising” and “coordinating” border issues. Premier Li Keqiang`s visit: India and China on the front line The Indian Foreign Minister said that the BDCA`s proposal was a broader agreement and that it would therefore be appropriate to discuss it. On 23 October 2013, India and China signed nine agreements/memorandum of understanding (Memorandum of Understanding), including the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA).
The main objective of the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement is to avoid border tensions and military counter-attacks along the Effective Line of Control (LAC) by deciding that neither side will use military capabilities to attack the other side, nor to strengthen patrols along the border. The other agreements/memorandum of understanding (Memorandum of Understanding) were